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UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF THE LAW, AS EMBRACED
IN MENTAL ALIENATION.'
No. 2.
The.greatest difficulties, and the largest number of unsolved
problems, arise in the administration of criminal jurisprudence.
The professions of medicine and of law have been tasked from the
earliest periods to harmonize in the results at which they should
arrive, and to establish such general principles as should be reasonable in themselves; and, while they should offer a shield to the
really insane, should, at the same time, protect the community
against the acts of criminals done under the guise of madness.
The plea of insanity, it should be remembered, is one easily
interposed; it is one that, if established by sufcient proofs,
offers impunity to crime; one that admits the act charged as
criminal to have been committed, and often boldly puts it forward
as evidence of the very insanity which is claimed to exonerate
from its commission; and one which sometimes a small amount of
proof will render so plausible as seemingly to establish. Under
1 Since the article in the preceding number was printed, the writer has been
favored by Hon. HENRY E. DAviEs, one of the judges of the Court of Appeals, with
a copy of his opinion, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Parish Will
Case, in which many points of great interest are discussed and decided relative to
the capacity to make a will. The case of Stewart's Ezecutor vs. Lis ,enard
26 Wend.
255, holding that a single advance above idiocy gives such capacity, is overruled,
and the more wise and salutary doctrine established, that the testator must have
sufficient capacity to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were, or should, or might have been the objects of his
bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will. That he must have

sufficient active memory to collect in his mind, without prompting, the particulars oi
elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient
length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to each other, and be
able to form some rationalfjudgmentin relation to them. Thus the result arrived at.
in this case, which has been so long vexing the courts, will be received with great
satisfaction by the profession, who have generally regarded with disfavor the
principle settled in the case of Stewart vs. Lispenard. The Parish Will Case will
Appear in the next volume of the New York Reports.
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all these inducements to present it, it is not surprising that its
appearance in court has been of late years quite frequent; so
much so that it has been at times so unfashionable to plead it,
that it has been received almost with derision. There are, however, reasons why it should have a fair hearing. The occurrence
of insanity, in all its varieties and degrees, becomes more and more
frequent as the means, processes, facts and results of civilization
become increased and multiplied. Man in his primitive state is
rarely ever insane. The Caucasian is about the only variety
that can lay claim to this malady, and, even in that variety, it
is very little prevalent in despotic governments. It is in those
that are free, in which mind can come freely into conflict with
mind, in which every chord of this curiously toned instrument
is kept constantly strung, that every possible variety of mental
derangement is of the most frequent occurrence. And thus, as
new exigencies arise for mental action, new phases of mental
alienation may appear, and hence, new series of phenomena may
spring up, which cannot be brought within any rule, principle, or
test already established. This must give rise to many unsolved
problems in this department of the law.
It must be all along borne in mind that the act charged as
criminal can only in the eye of the law become such, when it is
done with a criminal intent. A failure to establish that, deprives
it of that moral element which alone can constitute crime. Without that the act could only inflict an injury, but never a wrong.
The blow of a maniac, although it might create an injury, yet
could no more inflict a wrong than the kick of a horse or the fall
of a stone. Very different is a blow dealt with all the fulness of
intention. Then the act is punished as criminal, not only to
render justice to the person injured and wronged, but also to
exert a salutary effect in the prevention of the occurrence a second
time of the same offence. This latter would be entirely lost in its
effect upon the maniac. If really deranged he could no more be
reformed by punishment than any one of the animal creation.
The question always presenting itself is, what is the kind and
extent of mental alienation which can be legally interposed as a
Von. 1O.--3
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defence to an indictment for a criminal offence ? The answer to
this question will bring to view the different tests which courts of
law have proposed for the purpose of determining the validity of
every plea setting up insanity as a defence. These tests, and the
constructions which courts have placed upon them, become, therefore, important matters of inquiry.
The first and oldest test, and that in relation to which there is
no controversy, is, " when the defendant is incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in reference to the particularact." This
may cover and exonerate two classes of mentally alienated: viz.
the one whose alienation consists in preternatural defect, as being
idiotic, imbecile, or demented; the other, all those afflicted with
general mania, The application of this test has become widened
as human experience has become more extended. In the Trial of
Arnold, in 1723, 8 Hargrave's State Trials 822, Mr. Justice TRACY
insisted that to be exonerated under this test, a man must he totally
deprived of his understandingand memlr~y, a limitation which, fortunately, the courts have not thought proper since to adhere to.
A total privation is never now insisted upon. It is deemed sufficient if a privation exist in reference to the -particular aot. In
the answer of the fifteen judges to the House of Lords, in 1848,
'in the cage bf .McNaughton, 8 Scott N. R. 595, they say, " it must
be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a, defect of reason from disease
of the mind, as not to know -the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong." The law as administered in England, to
be consistent with itself, must refuse to partial insanity the effect
of exoneration from crime. "If that cannot legally affect man's
civil relations, it cannot be expected to affect those which are
,criminal.

-

The second test is more recent, and may be stated to be ccwhen
the defendant is acting under an insane delusion as to circumstances, which, if true, would -relieve-he act from responsibility, or
-where his reasoniilgpowert are so depraved as to make the comm ission of the particularact the natural consequence of the delusion."
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This test was first introduced, and the legitimate effect of delusion
in criminal jurisprudence first put forward and admitted in The
King vs. .Hadfield, 27 Howell's State Trials 1281. The speech
of Lord Erskine upon that trial is a splendid specimen of juridical
reasoning. The grounds taken by him and acquiesced in by the
court were,
1. That it is the reason of man which makes him accountable for
his actions, and that the deprivation of reason acquits him of
crime.
2. That it is unnecessary that reason should be entirely subverted or driven from her seat, but that it is sufficient if distraction
sit down upon it along with her, holds her trembling hand upon it,
and frightens her from her propriety.
3. That the law will not measure the sizes of men's capacities,
so as they be compos mentis.
4. That there is a difference between civil and criminal responsibility. That a man affected by insanity is responsible for his
criminal acts where he is not for his civil.
5. That a total deprivation of memory and understanding is not
required to constitute insanity.
6. That the individual is irresponsible where the insanity consists in hallucination; where the disease springs directly from the
delusive sources of thought, and all their deductions, within the
scope of the malady, are founded upon the immovable assumption
of matters as realities, either without any foundation whatever, or
so distorted and disfigured by fancy as to be nearly the same
thing as their creation.
7. That the act complained of and sought to be avoided, must
be the immediate unqualified offspring of the disease. Dean's Medical Jurisprudence 535-6.
The law in relation to the test of delusion has been more recently
stated, with great caution, in one of the answers of the fifteen judges
in the case of .cNaughton, before referred to, to wit: "cThat their
answer must depend on the nature of the delusion; but making the
assumption that he labors under such partial delusion only, as is not
in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same

596

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF THE LAW,

situation as to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which
the delusion exists were real. For example; if,-under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of
taking away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in selfdefence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion
was, that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such suppqsed
injury, he would be liable to punishment.^
.
This statement is certainly characterized by extreme caution;
but the question arises, whether it .really covers the whole ground.
Is it true that no other delusion except that, embraced in' the statement would afford a protection from an act otherwise criminal?
The delusion under which Hadfleld deliberately discharged,.his
pistol at King George III., at Drury-Lane Theatre,, intending to
kill him, would not, upon the principle here stated, have been
available. He was persuaded by a religious enthusiast.and induced
to believe "that a great change of things in this world was sbout
to take place; that the Messiah was to come out of his, the entA-.
siast's, mouth, and that, if the king was removed, all the obstacles
to the completion of their wishes would be removed. also."., T4hi
removal of the king came from that time to be a fixed idea in the
mind of Hadfield, and under this delusion he comitd the.act ;for
which he was tried and acquitted.
.
It is clear, however, that the doctrine as settled in,the case of
Hadfleld, has not been uniformly adhered to in England,.and that,
in a case of delusion, recurrence has again been bad,.to..the test of
ability to distinguish right from wrong. Thus, in,
the tial of Belingham for the shooting of lHon. Spencer Percival, whiqol occurred
in 1812, twelve years after the trial of Hadfleld, (see 1 Collinson
on Lunacy 650,) it appeared that he labored under many, ixsane,
delusions, the principal of which were that his own .private grievances were national wrongs; that his losses should be made good
by government; that the government refused, and he determined,
by shooting its prime minister, to, bring his affairs before thp
country, where he supposed he should, obtain justice. The point
of delusion seems not here to have been presented, as Lord ?44N-
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charged the jury that the single question for them to determine was, whether, when he committed the offence charged upon
him, he had sufficient understanding to distinguish good from evil,
right from wrong, and that murder was a crime not only against
the law of God, but against the law of his country. He was convicted and executed.
In the case of The King vs. Orford, (5 Carrington &Payne 168,)
the defendant was shown to labor under the delusion that the inhabitants of Hadleigh, and particularly the deceased, were continually issuing warrants against him, with intent to deprive him of
liberty and life. Lord LYNDHUBST charged the jury that they must
be satisfied, before they could acquit the prisoner on the ground
of insanity, that he did not know, when he committed the act,
what the effect of it, if fatal, would be, with reference to the crime
of murder. That the question was, did he know that he was committing an offence against the laws of God and nature? On a
careful examination of the whole case it is pretty apparent that
the point Lord LYNDRURST decided was, that a man who, under an
insane delusion, shoots another, is irresponsible when the act is the
product of the delusion. In confirmation of this was the verdict of
the jury, which was one of acquittal on the ground of insanity.
There is little doubt but that in this country a delusion or hallucination completely established, and sufficiently connected with the
act done, would divest it of the character of crime. The question
first arising is, how is the fact of the entertainment of delusion or
hallucination to be arrived at? There seems but one way of doing
this, and that is by giving in evidence the acts and declarations of
the defendant himself in reference to this point. Those acts and
declarations are accordingly admissible for the purpose of showing
the state of mind of the party, and that whether they were done
or made before or after the doing of the act complained of. Lake
vs. The People, 1 Parker's Crim. Rep. 495. The effect of the
hallucination thus ascertained must be pronounced by the law. If
any facts are in dispute it is for the jury alone to find them. The
establishing the fact of delusion, and the tracing the act complained of to it as its direct, natural, or necessary consequence,
PIELD
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makes out a perfect defence. Tnder this principle Hadfield was
properly acquitted, and Bellingham should have been- acquitted
also. The case of The People vs. Lawrence, 48 Niles' Register
119, does not seepn to come so completely within the principle,
although the doctrine as settled in The Zing vs. Hadfield, resulted
in the acquittal of the prisoner. Lawrence labored under-the
delusion that he was entitled to the English crown,.and applied to
General Jackson, then President of the United States, for the
grant of a sufficient sum of money to enable him to assert his right
to it. The general refused the grant, upon or after which Lawrence endeavored to shoot him by discharging at him a pistol. The
doubt here would be whether the act was sufficiently connected with
1
the delusion.
In the case of Freemanvs. The People, 4 Denio 10, the prisoner
was tried on a charge of murder, and was shown, on the trial,'to
possess a very limited capacity, and to have been laboring' under
some delusions or hallucinations as to his right to obtain compensation for services rendered in the state's prison at Auburn, N. Y.;
and failing to obtain anything by endeavoring to commence suits,
he supposed he must commence killing for that purpose, and actually killed four in the family of Van Nest, and badly wounded
another. In this case the question presented to the court was no
other than the finding whether the capacity to distitiguish between
right and wrong was a finding of sanity. And the court say that
this, (the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong,) as a
test of insanity, is by no means invariably correct, for while a. person has a very just perception of the moral qualities of most actions,
he may, at the same time, as to some one in particular, be absolutely insane, and consequently, as to this, be incapable of judging
accurately between right and wrong. That if the delusion extends
to the alleged crime, on the contemplated trial, the party manifestly is not in a fit condition to make his defence, however sound
his mind may be in other respects.
The third test is where the defendant is impelled by a morbid and
uncontrollable impulse to commit the particularact. The state of
mind which originates such an act has been variously denominated.
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The more general term is moral insanity. It has also been called
impulsive insanity; and a term more recently proposed is that of
volitional insanity. Here lie more especially the unsolved problems
of the law. This state of mind, or species of insanity, is by no
means universally admitted. Even the medical profession are not
agreed in its admission, although those the most conversant with
the insane are the more generally in its favor. To show what it is,
I will give, as a sample, the statement of one afflicted with it:- I was lying on the sofa, and my wife and children were sitting
by the fire; I had been talking to them very comfortably, when
suddenly my eye caught the poker,-a desire came upon me which
I could not control; it was a desire to shed blood. I combated
with it as long as I could. I shut my eyes and tried to think of
something else, but it was of no use; the more I tried the worse I
became, until at last I could bear it no longer, and, with a voice
of thunder, I ordered them all out of the room. Oh! had they
resisted-had they opposed me, I should have murdered them
every one. I must have done it; no tongue can tell how I thirsted
to do it." At the time this statement was made the-physician
found him in a state of great agitation, countenance flushed, eyes
unusually bright and shining, pulse rapid, breathing hurried and
disturbed, as though he was just recovering from some violent
mental commotion. It would appear from this statement that
there was
1. No preternatural defect, or want of mental power.
2. No delusion or hallucination was present.
8. No absence of the moral sense, or power of distinguishing
between right and wrong.
4. No perversion of his natural affections, as his love for his
wife and children seems unabated.
5. None of the indications of a demented or insane mind seem
here to be present; and yet the physical indications proclaim to
the physician that some unseen but mighty influence is at work
sbmewhere in the system, and most probably in the brain. And
yet, with this disagreement among the doctors, and the conservatism and attachment to precedents with the courts, it is slow
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indeed in obtaining a foothold there. Questions of this kind havn
much the most frequently arisen in the lower courts, and hence
are only to be found in newspapers, pamphlets, and periodicals.
This malady is recognised and ably described by Chief Justice
GiBsoN, of Pennsylvania, in his charge to the jury, as given in
Wharton & Stilld's Medical Jurisprudence, § 54. "There is,"
says he, "a moral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an irresistible inclination to kill or to commit some other particular offence.
There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing
it to consequences which it sees but cannot avoid, and placing it
under a coercion which, while its results are clea'rly perceived, is.
incapable of resistance. The doctrine which acknowledges this
mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognised only in
the clearest cases. It ought to be shown to have been habitual,
or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single instancee
It is seldom directed against a particular individual; butthat it
may be so, is proved by the case of the young woman who was
deluded by an irresistible impulse to destroy her child,, though
aware of 'the heinous nature of the act. The freqaency of this
constitutional malady is fortunately small, and it is better to confine it within the strictest limits. If juries were to allow it as ia
general motive, operating in cases of this character, its recognition
would destroy social order as well as personal safety. To establish
it as a justification in any particular case, it is necessary either to
show, by clear proofs, its contemporaneous existence evinced by
present circumstances, or the existence of an habitual tendency
developed in previous cases, becoming in itself a second nature."
So, also, Judge LEwIs, recently chief justice of Pennsylvania,
says, "Moral insanity arises from the existence of some of the
natural propensities in such violence, that it is impossible not to
yield to them. It ought never to be admitted as a defence, until
it is shown that these propensities exist in such violence, as to subjugate the intellect, control the will, and render it impossible for
the party to do otherwise than yield. Where its existence is fully
established, this species of insanity relieves from accountability to
human laws." That this species of insanity exists and is distinctly

AS EMBRACED IN MENTAL ALIENATION.

recognised by the medical profession and by courts of law is obvious
from the following references :-See Article by Dr. Woodward, 1
Amer. Journ. of Insan. 322; People vs. .Keim, 2 Id. 245; Beviaw
of Case of Abner Baker, 3 Id. 26; Case of Beibello, Id. 41; -Essay
by Dr. Aubanel, Id. 107; The People vs. Griffin, Id. 227; The
People vs. Sprague, 6 Id. 254; Same Case, in 2 Parker's Crim.
Rep. 43; Commonwealth vs. Furbush, 9 Amer. Journ. of Insan.
151; Warren's Remarks on Oxford and McNaughten's Case, 7
Id. 318; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, Pamphlet issued by Bemes &
Bigelow, also in 1 Amer. Journ. of Insan. 258, and 7 Metcalf 500;
Commonwealth'vs. losler, 4 Barr 266; State vs. Spencer, I Zabriskie 196; Trial of Willard Clark, 12 Amer. Journ. of Insan.
212; Daniell on Impulsive Insanity, Amer. Journ. of Insan., July
number for 1846, p. 10; Paper read before the Judicial Society, by
Forbes Winslow, M. D., D. C. L., on the Legal Doctrine of Responsibility in Cases of Insanity connected with alleged Criminal
Acts, 15 Amer. Journ. of Insan. 156; The Case of John Freeth,
15 Id. 297; Dr. Bay's -Examination of the Objections to tle
Doctrine of Moral Insanity, 18 Id. 112; and Dr. J. Parigot on
lJ3_oral Insanity in relation to CriminalActs, noticed in 18 Id. 305.
The difficulty with courts has not been so much the recognition
of this species of insanity as the settlement of the tests to be
applied and the forms under which it is admissible. There is a
natural and proper reluctance to departing from the old tests which
mmemorial custom and usage have so long approved and sanctioned. And yet these, without so far stretching as to endanger
that distinctive character which constitutes their value, are inadequate to the embracing of this species of insanity. The plain
reason is that it is a species which was utterly unknown when
these tests were adopted. We accordingly witness in very many
of these cases an anxious reaching out by the court, either so to
expand or enlarge an old test, or to propose some new one, under
which this phase of insanity may be included. Thus, Chief Justice
HORNBLOWER, in the State vs. Spencer, 1 Zabris. 196, says, " In
my judgment, the true question to be put to the jury is, whether
the prisoner was insane at the time of committing the act; and in
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answer to that question there is little danger of a jury's giving a
negative answer, and convicting a prisoner who is proved to be
insane on the subject-matter relating to or connected with the
criminal act, or proved to be so far and so generally.deranged as
to render it difficult, or almost impossible, to discriminate between
his sane and insane acts."
In The People vs. ifleim, above referred to, Judge EDMONDS
says, " If some controlling disease was in truth the acting power
within him, which he could not resist, or if he had not a sufficient
use of his reason to control the passions which prompted the act
complained of, he is not responsible; but we must 'be sure not to
be misled by a mere impulse of passion, an idle frantic humor, or
unaccountable mode of action, but inquire whether it is an absolute
dispossession of the free and natural agency of the human mind."
He also reminded the jury that they were to bear in mind that the
moral as well as the intellectual faculties may be so disordered by
the disease as to deprive the mind of its controlling and directing
power.
In the case of John Preeth, a Pennsylvania case, before referred
to, Mr. Justice LUDLOW, in his charge to the jury, says, " Besides
the kinds of insanity to which I have already referred, and which,
strictly speaking, affect the mind only, we have moral or homicidal
insanity, which seems to be an irresistible inclination to kill, or to
commit some other particularoffence. We are obliged by the farce
of authority to say to you, that there is such a disease, known, to
the law as homicidal insanity." And again, ",if the prisoner was
actuated by an irresistible inclination to kill, and was utterly
unable to control his will, or subjugate his intellect, and was not
actuated by anger,jealousy, revenge, and kindred evil passions, he
is entitled to an acquittal, provided the jury believe that the stxte
of mind now referred to has been proven to have existed without
doubt, and to their satisfaction."
In the Trial of Willard Clark, before referred to, in Connecticut,
Hon. WM. W. ELSWORTH charged the jury that, ", If, at the time
of the alleged offence, the prisoner had capacity and reason enough
to enable him to distinguish Letween right and wrong in this
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instance, or to understand the nature, character, and consequences
of the act, and could apply his knowledge to this case. not being
overcome by an irresistible impulse arising from disease, then he
was an accountable being, but otherwise he was not."
In the Commonwealth vs. Bogers, before referred to, a Massachusetts case, Chief Justice SHUAW, a high authority in the law,
thus charged the jury: " If it is proved to the satisfaction of the
jury, that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound
state, the question will be, whether the disease existed to so high a
degree, that, for the time being, it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the
homicide, actedfrom an irresistibleand uncontrollable impulse; if
so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the
involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind
directing it."
It is submitted that the charge of. the late chief justice, in this
case, embraces all the elements that are necessary for the protection
both of the accused, if really laboring under this species of insanity,
and of the community if he is not. It will be noticed that the first
point to establish is the disease and unsound state of the mind.
Here appropriately comes in the paper of -Dr.J P.arigot,before
referred to, in which he insists upon the fact that mental disease
cannot be predicated where there are no physical signs; and that,
for law purposes, insanity may be defined ",the loss of power of
control either over one or more of our mental faculties, including
especially the absence of free will, demonstrated by moral and physiological symptoms." That, in a medical point of view, it is an
idiopathic or sympathetic disease of the brain, which interferes
with the psychological and physiological functions of this organ.
In the illustration we have given of this species of insanity, there
were physiological indications plainly significant of disease; and it
is apprehended generally that a power thus terribly seizing upon
the mental faculties, depriving them of the exercise of all voluntary power, and arresting instantaneously their normal action,
compelling them to move in new directions, and under new impulses, leaving at the same time the mind free from all delusion,

